Reformasi Pengaturan Gratifikasi: Analisis Perbandingan Indonesia, Singapura, dan Korea Selatan

Abstract

Gratification represents one of the most pervasive yet subtle forms of corruption within Indonesia’s bureaucratic environment. Its ambiguity—often disguised as social gifts or tokens of appreciation—creates legal complexities that blur the boundary between legitimate social customs and illicit bribery. This article examines Indonesia’s gratification framework under Law No. 31/1999 jo. Law No. 20/2001, identifies its normative weaknesses, and analyzes implementation challenges, including reporting culture, evidentiary limitations, and bureaucratic patronage. Through a comparative study of Singapore’s Prevention of Corruption Act and South Korea’s Kim Young-Ran Act, this paper finds that both countries employ more assertive models—reverse burden of proof in Singapore and strict gift-cap regulation in South Korea. These models highlight the need for Indonesia to reconstruct its gratification regulation through clearer normative standards, improved institutional enforcement, strengthened reporting mechanisms, and cultural reform. The study concludes that effective gratification control requires an integrated system combining regulatory clarity, institutional capacity, and integrity-based governance.